Wednesday, August 22, 2007

Runner-Runner, Runner-Up

I went to Vegas last weekend, and I had been feeling a little bit donkish after tilting away all my winnings for the trip in the last 10 minutes at Bally’s. I pretty much reverted back to my former self at the poker table – pushing too hard with top pair, paying off sets, putting everyone on draws. Basically the way I played when I first started playing poker in the 714.

Came back, had a productive day at work on Monday. I arrived home to find out that Billy was back on Full Tilt, playing cash games. I was immediately stricken with jealousy, and it wasn’t long before I was on it again too. I played some small games early on – a limit Sit n Go (took 3rd … damn those donkeys) and some HORSE. It was fun – it felt good to be back.

But a part of me really wanted to play in a multi-table tournament. After reading so much Dan Harrington over the past month, I was itching to put myself to the test. I signed up for a 90-player Sit n Go and it was off to the races.

In the beginning, I definitely caught more than my fair share of cards. I hit sets on probably three of my first five pocket pairs. But I played them well also, and made sure that I got paid off nicely each time. I was the tournament chip leader for at least half of the tournament’s four hours. Still, I can’t say my results were entirely due to good cards; around about the middle of the tournament, the deck just about froze on me. But since blinds were going up, and everyone wanted to cash, I was able to increase my chip lead by being aggressive and picking my spots well. I applied Harrington’s concept of “sticking and moving” in the middle rounds as best I could, and when it came to be bubble time, I was had a 2 to 1 chip advantage over the next biggest stack. I was in pretty good position to secure my second ever multi-table tournament win.

As we neared the final table, I relinquished the chip lead but continued to play well. Stayed patient, stayed alive, and didn’t get timid. The final table was ridiculous – it seemed like there were a lot of huge all-in preflop races where the overcards flopped a pair, but the pocket pair rivered the set to either double up or knock someone out. Must have happened six or seven times at least … even I was the beneficiary of one of those. (I guess it’s true that the pocket pair is the favorite in those situations, haha.)

Finally I made it to heads up play, and my top pair got cracked by a runner-runner two pair. Of course, I had my Phil Hellmuth moment, stomping and screaming around my living room. I didn’t care so much about the difference in monetary prizes. I just wanted the title. I wanted some more bragging rights for Grind or Gamble. For UCLA. For the 714. But it wasn’t to be.

Still, I learned a lot about myself. I learned that I have what it takes to do well in big tournaments. In an upcoming post, I will probably lay out my plan to play a lot of live MTT’s over the next three years, in order to stay on track to start playing WSOP events in 2010. But for now, I’ll just smile through gritted teeth for my second-place finish. I should have won. Maybe next time.

Thursday, August 16, 2007

A Game to Improve my Memory (Seven-Card Stud)

A year-and-a-half ago, I was primarily a Seven-Card Stud player. This was after experiencing mind-bottling swings back and forth in my bankroll playing online, and pretty much losing all confidence in my ability to be a consistent winner at no limit Texas hold’em.

But there was no way I was quitting poker entirely. I just needed a new game to learn. My first trips to casinos started me out with limit hold’em, so I was fairly familiar with that game. I had read books on it, played a lot of it, but was weary of it after 9-4 offsuit rivering a third 4 to crack my overpair too many times. No thanks on going back to that.

There was also Omaha 8, a game that’s spread in a lot of the casinos here in Southern California. The fish that frequent the cardrooms seem to enjoy it, as they feel fully justified in playing lots of starting hands and chasing a lot. It satisfies their desire to gamble in ways that limit hold’em can only begin to approach. I’d been told by a few savvy players that Omaha was the game to play, because so few people played it well and there was so much action. Still, I didn’t relish the thought of putting significant portions of my bankroll in jeopardy learning a game that was brand new to me. Furthermore, there wasn’t a preponderance of literature on the subject at the time, so I decided that Omaha wasn’t yet the game for me.

How about Stud? All I really knew about it was the basic format, and that the tables seemed to be mostly filled with old timers and young donkeys that were running bad at hold’em. (I’m trying my best not to think about how well that second category fit me at the time.) But I had a copy of Supersystem, and thus I decided to read Chip Reese’s section on Seven-Card Stud. The strategy that Mr. Reese outlined seemed fairly straightforward, and so I committed it to memory and soon tried my hand at the $4-8 Stud games at the Commerce Casino.

I enjoyed early successes. The more experienced players at the tables rarely gave me credit for having anything. I played aggressively, and I generally got paid off. Their lack of respect for my abilities ensured that I could expect to leave each session ahead a few hundred dollars on average. However, as a few months passed, and I was playing with the same players regularly, they began go to get a handle on my game. I found that I was getting trapped more often, and that my big hands were getting paid off less. I went back to the text of Supersystem, and tried to plug the holes in my game as best I could. I also tried finding articles online, but for the most part they were written for a pretty basic level of play. A skill level that would get eaten alive in the games I played in. I was missing something, but I didn’t really know what it was. I was completely baffled on how I could be a winner at Stud. Just like no limit hold’em, it seemed that I couldn’t beat the game any more.

Eventually, I just gave up poker entirely.

It started out as just a break. But with Billy out of the country, I didn’t really have anyone to get my competitive fire going. Didn’t have anyone in my ear yapping about bad beats, or blogging about improving their game. I lost interest in it. My girlfriend was happier when I wasn’t playing poker. My family was happy to hear that I was off it. I was focused on work and the classes I was taking at night. Poker was no longer a part of my life.

Well, eventually all that changed, and when I came back to the game, it was playing no limit hold’em. I came back to find out that the live games were as juicy as ever, and I saw some of the biggest cashouts of my life in early 2007. Since then, my game has steadily improved (though I can’t say the same for my bankroll), including a sharp increase in poker acumen over the past month or so. I feel like my skills at no limit hold’em have never been better.

Recently, Billy and I were jokingly brainstorming on ways he could improve his memory of his hole cards in hold’em. He has a history of forgetting exactly which two cards he’s holding, and for some reason, he still hasn’t taught himself to consistently double-check. We always get a good laugh when he quickly mucks a hand based upon what he convinced himself he was holding rather than what he actually had.

And even though I give Billy a hard time for failing to remember cards he had just seen, the discussion caused me to realize an area in which my Stud game could use a lot of improvement. As they say, Seven-Card Stud is “a game of live cards.” This means that it is crucial to always be aware of how live your hand is at all times. That is, you have to have a very good idea of how many outs you and your opponents have to make their hands.

As you play Stud, the reasons that memory is important become obvious. Say you have an open-ended straight draw on 5th Street, and need either a King or an 8 to make your hand. However, a player to your right who had been inactive until this point just caught a King, and leads out with a bet, representing that the King helped him. In order to know how many outs you have left, you have to think back to the earlier streets and the cards people folded. Did anyone fold a King or an 8? Do I have the full seven outs, or is it fewer? You cannot determine if you are being offered the right pot odds if you cannot recall how live your hand is.

Assume for a second that again, a King is leading out on 5th Street, but this time you have two Queens in the hole. Now, it’s pretty clear that if he has the pair of Kings that he is representing, you will want to know if any Queens have been folded already. Chances are, you’ve been paying careful attention to the cards out there, and you will immediately know if a Queen or any of your kickers has been folded somewhere. You’ll be looking out for that. But you should remember all the cards that come out. Have two people folded Kings already? If so, then it’s unlikely that your opponent actually has the case King. But if you only focus on the cards that help you, you likely would have missed whether or not anyone had folded a King.

At least, I would have. Everyone can remember what they have seen. Some simply have a better sense than others, and I’m definitely among the ‘others.’ I recognized that I had been probably sacrificing a ton of profit by not having a better handle on what my outs and my opponent’s outs were. Either by calling bets when I didn’t have live cards, or not extracting the maximum when my cards were the best. But like with Omaha 8, I didn’t want to lose a lot of money just practicing improving my memory at the tables.

So I came up with a game that would help me remember what cards have been folded in Seven-Card Stud. It is set up like an eight-handed Stud game, except there are no hole cards. Eight door cards are dealt out. The low card stays in, and then the three players to act after the low card all fold. The folded cards go into a discard pile.

On 4th Street, I act as if the high hand leads with a bet (though no chips are necessary). The two players left of the high both fold and their cards are placed into a second discard pile.

On 5th Street, there are three “players” remaining. Once again, the high hand stays in, and the hand immediately to the left discards into a third pile.

On 6th Street, it is heads up and the low hand discards into a fourth pile, and the game is over.

Next, I create a chart of the hands that I can remember being folded, as follows:



I give myself 1 point for every card I can remember from 6th Street. 5th Street cards are worth 2 points each. 4th Street cards are worth 4 points each and 3rd street are worth 8 point apiece. If I did my math correctly, that should work out to a total of 50 points possible.

As I get better and better at identifying how many of each card rank have been folded, I’ll start upping the ante by attempting to remember the specific suits. Once I’ve played this game enough times and remembering what’s been folded becomes second nature, then I can go back to the tables and focus more on watching my opponents instead of watching the cards. Who knows? Maybe one day I’ll be able to perform the Rounders scene in real life, and read all my opponents’ hands blind.



Tuesday, August 14, 2007

Acting Strong when you’re Strong (Follow-Up)

So last night was the big home game, and I had a couple of opportunities to practice what I just preached in the last post. I flopped some huge hands early in the session, and each time I was faced with the question of how best to get paid off. (FYI: Our home game is a no limit hold’em cash game, with $0.10 and $0.25 blinds.)

Hand A
I picked up the 7s-6c in the cutoff seat, and decided to limp in after several people limped in front of me. The button folded, and the small and big blind called and checked, respectively. The flop was nice – Qh-7c-7h. Ben, a loose-aggressive player, bet out $1.25 into the pot of $1.50 from the small blind. It was folded around to me, and I was pretty sure that Ben was holding a Queen only. Since he is an aggressive player, I figured a call would probably get him to bet out again on the turn. A raise here would probably scare him off. So I just called -- standard play.

The turn brought the 7d, giving me four of a kind. Ben, as expected, bet out again – this time for $1.50. Now, how to get him to pay off my quads with his full house? Instead of smooth-calling his little bet, I decided I was going to come in for a raise. However, I didn’t want to completely announce that I was holding the case 7. I decided to “Hollywood” him a little bit, and represent that I also held a Queen.

“I think we’re probably chopping here [i.e., splitting the pot with a tied hand],” I said to him casually, “but I’m going to raise just in case you don’t have a Queen.” I made it $4.50 to go, and he nodded his head dutifully and called.

The river was a King, which wasn’t the greatest card for me because now he might fear a bigger boat. Ben checked to me, and I considered making a small bet that he would have to call. But it occurred to me that he would probably have to call all in, since the turn bet had knocked his stack down to about $5 and the pot was $13. I put him all in, and he called. He didn’t seem all that surprised to see my quads, which, considering my little speech, I guess I can’t blame him for.

Maybe acting isn’t my strong suit?

Hand B
A little later, I was in the in big blind with As-Kc. Nice. I love picking up big hands in the big blind, because I get to see what everyone else does before I decide how strong I want to play them. Especially when it's the Ace of spades. Just a beautiful card.

Anyway, there was an early position limper, and then Sean raised it up to $1 in middle position. Sean is a tight-aggressive player, which normally would be considered a good thing. But unfortunately, he has two major holes in his game: inability to extract the maximum from his opponents and inability to get away from second best hands. Another thing that isn’t necessarily a hole but hurts him is a huge fear of being bluffed. Not the best combination of liabilities for a no limit hold’em player.

It was folded around to me, and I re-raised to $3.25. The limper folded, and Sean thought for a moment before calling. The flop was almost too good: Ac-Ad-4s. A monster for me, but normally trip Aces don’t get paid off all that well. So I had to ask myself, How do I make sure I get something out of this for once? I don’t want to scare Sean out of the pot. But if I check, I’ll have two options if he bets. I can either check-call or check-raise him. Either of these moves looks scary to most hands he could have that don't contain an Ace.

What I want to do is make it look like I’m trying to steal the pot from him. With a board like A-A-x, most players just won’t put you on the Ace until your actions say that you have it. Furthermore, just about no one is expecting you to bet a flop like that if you’re holding an Ace. If I bet here, I can really use Sean’s fear of being bluffed against him. I decided to make a smallish bet relative to the pot size ($3.75 into $6.85) and hope to the poker gods that he was holding a pocket pair. A bigger bet might look even more like a steal, but there's a chance Sean will fold to it anyway just because it's so large.

After I bet, I thought I would try and augment my deceptive play with a little more acting. Sean is an experienced enough player to recognize that typically weak means strong and strong means weak when it comes to physical tells. Initially, I considered acting strong in hopes that he would read me as weak. Still, that wouldn’t be convincing enough. Even better would be if I could act like I was acting strong. That is, I wanted to appear that I was weak and trying to appear strong. Do all the things players do when they're afraid but are trying their hardest not to show it. I pulled my hat down low so that he couldn’t see my eyes. I balled my hands into fists and used them to cover my mouth. I sat there like a statue, waiting for him to act, hoping he would take the bait.

He thought for a while, and called.

The turn was a bit of a scare card for me – the Jack of clubs. I was still pretty sure I had him beat, but immediately I started getting nervous. I had put him on a high-ish pair, and if he’d had pocket Jacks, he had just made a full house on me. Similarly, if he had smooth-called on the flop trying to trap me with A-J, he had just made an even better full house. I wasn’t all that happy to see it.

Still, this is poker, not tiddly-winks. If my charade was going to work, I had to keep looking like I was bluffing him. I bet out $5.75, throwing the chips out aggressively and in his direction. I was acting like I wanted him out of the pot, and I have to admit, the wee bit of nervousness I felt from seeing the Jack come out probably helped me to appear afraid of a call.

Sean thought a little longer this time, and the longer he thought the more convinced I became that he was holding either pocket Queens or pocket 10’s. He would have re-raised me preflop with Kings, and he would not have thought this long with any Ace or with pocket Jacks. He definitely would have folded a pair smaller than 10’s to my re-raise before the flop. Eventually Sean decided to push all in. I called and showed him the bad news. He groaned and showed me pocket Queens.**

I felt for him, he was in a rough spot there. But I was also kinda satisfied with myself. See, Sean is a full-time actor, and probably sees bad performances all the time. So maybe my acting ability isn’t quite as terrible as I’d thought; I had just managed to act my way into $30 worth of his chips. :-P


**As a side note, I think him losing that pot ended up costing him even more money later on. He got bluffed out of a very large pot while holding pocket Queens when there was a King on the board. He bet and called a raise on the flop, then checked and thought forever before folding to a big bet on the turn. I can’t be sure, but something tells me that losing the pot to me with Queens earlier was bouncing around in his head when he made the laydown later in the evening. Ouch.

Monday, August 13, 2007

Acting Strong when you’re Strong

It’s heads up on the turn, and you’re out of position against a solid player. You’re holding the Js-9c when the flop came Qh-Tc-6s. The turn is the 8s, giving you the nut straight. You check, because your opponent showed some strength on the flop and now that you have the nuts, you hope that she will bet again. Sure enough, she does bet half the pot. You pretend to think a while, trying to decide what to do, and decide to just call hoping that she will put you on some kind of draw. That way, if the draw misses, you may be able to get some kind of action out of her on the river.

The river is the 2h. Bingo! The board did not pair, did not complete a flush and did not complete a bigger straight. So we still have the nuts. Now, how do we get paid off?

Out of position, there are three options**. You can check again, hoping that she will bet out and you can get in a check-raise. You can make a value bet, hoping that she will call or raise you. Or you can move all-in and hope that she calls. Let see how each of these courses of action plays out.

1) Checking
This is the play that a lot of players would make. Since our opponent has bet on the flop and the turn, chances are she has at least a Queen (unless she’s totally bluffing). Even better would be if she has something as strong as two pair or trips, or 7-9 for a smaller straight. These are hands she would probably bet for value since the river was a blank. So it seems like checking in hopes of check-raising might be a good way to get our big hand paid off.

The problem with a check here is if she isn’t all that strong. How many times have you checked the river to trap only to kick yourself when the opponent checks as well? If she only has a Queen (one pair) or if she was totally bluffing, then there is a good chance that our opponent will check right behind us. Remember, that we’re up against a solid player. She will recognize that we have checked and called on two streets, and she isn’t likely to fire a third bullet without a huge hand. If she senses weakness, she might try and make a big bet to push us out, but few players have the fortitude to fire the third bullet on the river when they have been called down to that point. So there is a real danger that checking the river will not induce a third bet from our opponent.

2) Betting for Value
Another play that I see a lot is the value bet on the river. We want to avoid the pitfall of checking the river and having our solid opponent check as well. So we make a smallish suck-bet (perhaps 30-40% of the pot) in hopes that we will be called. It looks suspicious, since the 2h likely didn’t help us any. So we may get called by hands like A-Q, and we may even get raised by other hands. Since our opponent appears strong, let’s see if she’ll pay us off.

This option also has its issues. One big problem with a value bet is that, to a solid player, it looks like a value bet. Solid players will begin to consider the possibilities of what you could be betting for value, and will make the appropriate response. A bluffer will surely fold, and single pairs might do the same. Hands that are two pair or better might still reluctantly call, but then they might not depending on how good our opponent is.

3) Moving All-In
Most players shy away from this move when they have the nuts. They want to be sure they get paid off, and they feel that moving all-in will scare off hands that they want calling. The obvious benefit to moving all-in is that if you’re called, you’re guaranteed to have extracted the maximum from your opponent. If you check and they check (i.e., call your bet of $0) then you definitely haven’t gotten the maximum. Likewise, if you bet for value and they call, you’re always unsure if you could have gotten just a little bit more from them.

Despite this benefit, very few players would put in all their chips on the river with such a strong hand. They want to make a bet that would get called. But let’s look a little closer at the hands our solid opponent could have, and how she would respond to a push on the river.

A bad player that had been bluffing all along might bet into us if we check to her, but a solid player is less likely to do so. So a solid player that has been bluffing to this point will probably surrender if checked to, and certainly won’t call a value bet with rags.

Hands like A-Q or K-Q might have checked the river if we checked to them, giving up trying to take it down by betting and just hoping to show down the best hand. They also might fold if we bet for value, depending on the pot odds and their read on us. So we’re probably not going to get much from single pairs by either checking the river or betting it for value.

Hands that are two pair or better, however, are the hands that we might be able to get some action from by either checking or betting for value. These are stronger hands, and our opponent is looking to get value from her good hands just like we are. However, I would like to propose that the same hands that might call a value bet on the river might also call your all-in bet in the same situation.

Consider checking to a hand like a set of 6’s, hoping to trap her. She will make a value bet on the river, and you can check-raise her all-in. Will this solid opponent call your check-raise? Possibly, but from her point of view calling a check-raise is starting to seem negative EV. You have check-called her on the flop and the turn, and now you are check-raising her? It’s beginning to look like you’ve been trapping her instead of the other way around, and if she’s good enough there’s a chance that she might just talk herself into laying down her small set.

If you bet for value into her set, she will similarly slow down a bit. She’s probably not going to fold her set to a value bet, but she’s less likely to raise you than you might hope. After you’ve checked-called her twice, and then decide to bet into her on the river, a solid player may decide that it’s best to just call your bet with her strong (but non-nut) hand.

But what if you move all-in? This bet looks really suspicious, given the way the hand has been played thus far. You have check-called twice, representing that you are on a draw or trapping with a monster. For you to push all-in out of position looks a lot like you’re trying to buy the pot with a busted draw. If you had a monster hand, wouldn’t you just make a value bet and hope to get paid off? Furthermore, it’s less likely for you to have two pair or a set if she has two pair or a set herself, just because some of the cards you would need are accounted for. So while she still might fold hands like A-Q, she might be more inclined to call with stronger hands due to your deception. And since she might not have called your value bet with a single pair anyway, you’re not really sacrificing that many bets if she folds. The hands that she will call a value bet with are pretty much the same hands that she would call all in with. Your move on the river just looks too much like a steal. She’s more likely to call with anything decent.

One last thing before I go. Even if our opponent does correctly fold, it’s not the worst thing that could happen. Chances are we wouldn’t have won much more anyway. And furthermore, we get to pick up the pot without showing down the hand. Any time you are able to do this, it’s a bonus for your table image. Your opponent, and indeed everyone else at the table will have to ponder whether or not you were bluffing. The all-in move on the river just generally looks like a bluff. And if you occasionally do it when you have the goods, some of those times you’re going to get someone to call.

This is a realization I came to while working through Harrington on Hold’Em Vol. III, but I don’t pretend to believe my example was written as eloquently as his. Still, I hope that this analysis will help your post-flop play as much as it helped mine.


** For simplicity's sake, I have narrowed the number of options under the gun from a nearly infinite number down to three. I have essentially categorized all bets up to 100% the size of the pot as "Value Bets" and bets greater than than the size of the pot as "All-In Bets." I recognize that this is imprecise; however, I consider said imprecision to be immaterial to the argument as a whole.